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PROBLEMS IN THE REMOVAL OF FEDERAL CIVIL
SERVANTS*

Ivor L. M. Richardsont
publicity given in the past few years to the loyalty and
security program has brought the civil servant of the federal
government increasingly before the public eye. At the same time
little attention has been paid to the plight of a civil servant who is
dismissed from his post for reasons other than those relating to
loyalty and security. It is the purpose of this paper to consider
different aspects of the removal of civil servants. We shall discuss
(1) the government's power to remove civil servants both at common law and under statutes which deal with the exercise of the
removal power, (2) the procedural remedies available to a government worker ousted from office, (3) the loyalty program, and
(4) the effect of the invocation by a civil servant of the privilege
against self-incrimination.

T

HE

A. General
In the absence of a statute regulating removal the power to remove is unlimited1 and, failing a constitutional or statutory provision to the contrary, is exercisable by the appointing officer as an
incident of the power to appoint. 2 The grant of a general power
to remove carries with it the right to remove at any time or in any
manner deemed best with or without notice3 but, on the other
hand, where the causes for which an officer may be removed are
specified in a statute or in the Constitution, notice and hearing
are essential.4
• This article is a chapter taken from a dissertation submitted to the faculty of the
University of Michigan Law School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the S.J.D.
degree.
t Solicitor of the Supreme Court of New Zealand.-Ed.
1 Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 225 (1839).
2 Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 20 S.Ct. 574 (1900); Bratton v. United States,
90 Ct. Cl. 604 (1940); Levy v. Woods, (D.C. Cir. 1948) 171 F. (2d) 145.
3 In an unusual case, United States ex rel. Brown v. Lane, 40 App. D.C. 533 (1913),
the court said that, since the statute gave the Secretary of the Interior authority to remove
from a tribal council any member or members "for good cause to be by him determined,"
he might remove such members without notice or hearing. However, the court pointed
out that had the statute stopped at the words "for good cause" a different case would have
been presented.
4 Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 21 S.Ct. 842 (1901); Shurtleff v. United States,
189 U.S. 311, 23 S.Ct. 535 (1903); Kalbfus v. Siddons, 42 App. D.C. 310 (1914).

~
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As well as numerous special statutes affecting particular offices
and employments, there are five statutes dealing with the exercise
of the removal power, each with its own procedure for effecting
removals: the Hatch Act5 relating to removals for political activity;
the Civil Service Act of 19126 and the Veterans Preference Act7
restricting the removal of civil service employees to dismissal for
cause; section 12 of the latter statute8 regulating reductions in
force such as layoffs and demotions for reasons of economy; the
5 53 Stat. L. 1148 (1939), as amended, 5 U.S.C. (1952) § 118 (i). For procedure, see 5
C.F.R. §§4.1 to 4.108 (1949) as amended.
6 37 Stat. L. 555 (1912), as amended, 5 U.S.C. (1952) §652. The section provides:
"No person in the classified civil service of the United States shall be removed or suspended without pay therefrom except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of
such service and for reasons given in writing. Any person whose removal or suspension
without pay is sought shall (I) have notice of the same and of any charges preferred
against him; (2) be furnished with a copy of such charges; (3) be allowed a reasonable
time for filing a written answer to such charges, with affidavits; and (4) be furnished at
the earliest practicable date with a written decision of such answer. No examination of
witnesses nor any trial or hearing shall be required except in the direction of the officer
or employee directing the removal or suspension without pay. Copies of the charges, the
notice of hearing, the answer, the reasons for removal or suspension without pay, and
the order of removal of suspension without pay shall be made a part of the records of
the proper department or agency, as shall also the reasons for reduction in grade or
compensation; and copies of the same shall be furnished, upon request, to the person
affected and to the Civil Service Commission. . . ." The courts have generally interpreted
this section as requiring notice both of reasons for removal and of the charges against
the employee [e.g., Bennett v. United States, 89 Ct. Cl. 322 (1939)) but this is not so. The
section refers to two general groups, (I) persons removed by the appointing power "for
reasons given in writing" and (2) persons removed by the appointing power upon
"charges." In either case the removal is authorized only "for such cause as will promote
the efficiency of such service" [Arant v. United States, !i5 Ct. Cl. 327 (1920)). Admittedly
the statutory regulations [5 C.F.R. §§9.101 and 9.102 (1949) as amended) require the
employing agency to give notice both of the reasons for dismissal and of the charges, but
it is not settled if such regulations can give civil servants greater protection than that
required by statute; the general rule has been that they cannot (see the cases cited in
note 53 infra). Even United States v. Wickersham, 201 U.S. 390, 26 S.Ct. 469 (1906), has
been interpreted to accord to this view-Simon v. United States, 113 Ct. Cl. 182 (1949).
The reason for this is that such regulations are ultra vires the statutory rule-making
power, and though " •.. the President •.. has the right to establish regulations for the
guidance of his subordinates in deciding upon those who shall be removed .•• [he) has
no power to say that if these regulations are not followed the United States shall be
pecuniarily liable to the employee. Only Congress can say this. • . ." Simon v. United
States, supra at 204.
7 58 Stat. L. 390 (1944), as amended, 5 U.S.C. (1952) §863. The largest class covered
by this statute is that of honorably discharged servicemen and women who have permanent or indefinite civil service appointments to positions in the executive branch of the
government. The procedural requirements are greater than under the 1912 statute as
they also require thirty days written notice and provide for appeal to the Civil Service
Commission on substantive as well as procedural grounds.
s The section applies to all persons employed in a civil capacity in the executive
branch of the government except those appointed by the President alone or with the
consent of the Senate. It provides that reduction-in-force programs shall be implemented,
having regard to tenure of employment, military preference, length of service and efficiency ratings, and there is a similar provision for thirty days written notice and appeal
to the Civil Service Commission.
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1950 statute9 authorizing summary suspension and removal of persons in certain sensitive departments and agencies for reasons of
national security. It is not proposed to consider these statutory
provisions. in detail10 as the same legal principles are applied in
each case.
In general,11 the only two grounds upon which a federal employee may successfully attack the validity of his dismissal are (1)
where the procedural requirements incident to his removal were
not complied with, and (2) where the action of the removing
officer was taken in bad faith or was arbitrary and capricious.
The power to review a case to see if it meets the procedural
requirements extends no further than that,12 although it must be
admitted that even minor procedural irregularities are sufficient
to invalidate dismissals.13 Furthermore, the courts will exercise
jurisdiction if the stated cause is one made invalid by statute or
regulation,14 but in this connection it is important to note that,
even where causes for removal are specifically stated, the appointing officer will almost invariably be held to have a further right
of removal at his pleasure unless the grounds for removal are
expressly restricted by statute.11•
9 64 Stat. L. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §22. The act authorizes departmental or
agency heads to suspend employees in particular departments and agencies when it is
deemed necessary in the interests of national security. Such suspension is at the absolute
discretion of the departmental or agency head and must be followed either by reinstatement or by final removal accoi;ding to prescribed procedures.
10 For an excellent summary see note, 52 CoL. L. REY. 787 (1952).
11 One exception to this is in reduction-in-force cases where the courts will also review
an alleged violation of the employee's statutory right to be retained in preference to
persons in inferior categories. See Hilton v. Sullivan, 334 U.S. 323, 68 S.Ct. 1020 (1948);
Asher v. Forrestal, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 470. But note the restrictive effect in
this connection of the decision in Elder v. Brannan, 341 U.S. 277, 71 S.Ct. 685 (1951).
12 Elchibegoff v. United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 709 (1952); Love v. United States, (Ct. CI.
1951) 98 F. Supp. 770; Powell v. Brannan, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 871. The general
principle is that "The determination of whether or not a person's discharge would promote the efficiency of the Government service is vested in the administrative officer and
no court has power to review his action if that action was taken in good faith." Gadsden
v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 487 at 489, 78 F. Supp. 126 (1948).
13 Thus, in Stringer v. United States, 117 Ct. CI. 30, 90 F. Supp. 375 (1950), 29 days
written notice preceded by several days verbal notice did not satisfy the statutory requirement of 30 days adverse written notice. And see Norden v. Royall, (D.C. D.C. 1949) 90
F. Supp. 834; and Deak v. Pace, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 997. It should be noted,
however, that proceedings involving the "selection or tenure of an officer or employee of
the United States" are specifically exempted from the provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act which establishes a code of minimum procedural requirements for admin•
istrative adjudications. 60 Stat. L. 237 at 239 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C. (1952) §1001.
14 Levine v. Farley, (D.C. Cir. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 186 at 190-191. Again, the removal
is invalid if made by someone other than the appropriate officer (who is usually the
appointing officer). Stilling v. United States, 41 Ct. CI. 61 (1906); United States v. Wickersham, 201 U.S. 390, 26 S.Ct. 469 (1906).
15 Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 23 S.Ct. 535 (1903); Morgan v. T.V.A., (6th
Cir. 1940) 115 F. (2d) 990.
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Where the procedural requirements have been complied with
in the removal of a federal employee, the action of the administrative officer can be set aside only if it is shown that it was not
taken in good faith. But the courts have not been at all consistent
in determining the protection which this requirement confers on
federal employees.16 It is clear that the acquittal of a government
servant upon criminal charges preferred against him is not sufficient to establish that his removal "to promote the efficiency of
the service" was arbitrary.17 Furthermore, the fact that the President and the Civil Service Commission consider that the charges
against the employee are not substantiated and that there exists
no proper cause for his removal is irrelevant, since that matter is
for the removing officer to decide.18 In some cases the courts have
tended to overlook the good faith requirement altogether19 and
with unbecoming judicial self-abnegation have ruled that, if the
formal procedural steps are satisfied, judicial inquiry is absolutely
foreclosed. 20 However, in the more recent cases21 there seems to
16 Cf. Golding v. United States, 78 Ct. CI. 682 (1934), with Gadsden v. United States,
111 Ct. CI. 487, 78 F. Supp. 126 (1948).
17 Croghan v. United States, 116 Ct. Cl. 577, 89 F. Supp. 1002 (1950); Bryant v.
United States, 122 Ct. Cl. 460 (1952). This is because the considerations which enter into
an administrative determination of whether an employee has been guilty of such misconduct or delinquency in the performance of the duties of his· position as to justify his
removal for the good of the service are entirely dissimilar to those necessarily involved
in the conviction of a person of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Although
government servants need not be perfect nonentities so far as political expression is concerned, the removing officer may well take the view that the fact of having had such
charges levelled against him (and in the case of a jury trial a prima facie case has first
been made against him) may constitute reasonable cause for removing an employee.
18 Eberlein v. United States, 53 Ct. CI. 466 (1918); Morse v. United States, 59 Ct. Cl.
139 (1924). And see 30 Op. Atty. Gen. 79 at 83 (1913), confirming 21 Op. Atty. Gen. 356
(1896).
19 Asher v. Forrestal, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 470 at 471; Levine v. Farley, (D.C.
Cir. 1939) 109' F. (2d) 186 at 191; and, in particular, Golding v. United States, 78 Ct. CI.
682 (1934).
20 E.g., "The allegations that the plaintiff was innocent of the charges preferred
against him, that his removal was the result of a concerted action by certain individuals
and officials who had entered into a conspiracy to cause his removal, that his removal was
based on perjurious statements obtained through duress and undue influence, and that the
investigation which resulted in his removal was biased, prejudiced, and unfair, are
immaterial. It is not within the jurisdiction of the court to inquire into the guilt or
innocence of the plaintiff as to the charges upon which he was removed from office.•••
It appearing from the averments of the petition that every step requisite to the removal
from office of an employee of the Government in the classified civil service was taken by
Bureau officials in the plaintiff's case, action in removing him from office is conclusive
and is not subject to review by the court." Golding v. United States, 78 Ct. CI. 682 at
685 (1934).
21 E.g., Gadsden v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 487, 78 F. Supp. 126 (1948); Levy v.
United States, 118 Ct. CI. 106 (1950); Vallesteros v. United States, 125 Ct. Cl. 218 (1953);
Knotts v. United States, 128 Ct. Cl. 489, 121 F. Supp. 630 (1954).
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have been a greater willingness to insist upon the actual and not
merely nominal compliance with the requirement of good faithto assert that when discretion is conferred on an administrative
officer it must be honestly exercised and that, if his decision is
arbitrary or capricious or in bad faith, the courts have power to
review it and to set it aside.22
B. Remedies

Scanty though it is, the protection afforded the government
employee by the statutory provisions is greater in theory than in
practice. For he encounters many pitfalls when he attempts to
secure judicial review of his removal. When a government servant
has been separated in violation of either a statute or a statutory
regulation the Court of Claims has jurisdiction23 to award him
his salary during the period of unjustified removal. But, as a
result of an almost unbelievably crass misconstruction of an earlier
decision, the court for a while effectively prevented employees
from recovering compensation for removals violating statutory
procedural requirements. The discharged employee had almost
invariably been replaced by the time his action was heard and
consequently the court said that his remedy was an appropriate
proceeding to try the right to office so that his successor might
also be heard as to his right to the compensation provided and
to the office itself.24 This meant that the discharged employee
;22 Thus, where a civil servant has been discharged not for a cause that promoted the
efficiency of the service, but maliciously, merely because his superior did not like him, or
merely because he wanted his job for a friend, the discharge is wrongful and illegal and
the employee is entitled to recover whatever loss he may have suffered therefrom. Gadsden
v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 487, 78 F. Supp. 126 at 127 (1948). See too Knotts v. United
States, 128 Ct. Cl. 489, 121 F. Supp. 630 (1954).
23 28 u.s.c. (1952) §1491.
24 See, e.g., Goodwin v. United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 218 (1932), in which the court applied
dicta from O'Neil v. United States, 56 Ct. Cl. 89 (1921) which was properly dependent
for its validity on the fact that it concerned an executive regulation relating to removals
which was ultra vires the statutory rule-making power under the 1883 statute and before
the 1912 statute. This same doctrine was followed in numerous other cases, e.g., "Wilmeth
v. United States, 64 CL Cl. 368 (1928); O'Leary v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 635 (1933);
Hart v. United States, 91 CL Cl. 308 (1940). And see Westwood, "The 'Right' of an
Employee of the United States Against Arbitrary Discharge," 7 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 212
(1938). Also compare this practice with the dictum of a district court in Curran v. Higgiston. (D.C. Mass. 1937) 18 F. Supp. 969 at 970: "The generally accepted method of
testing the right of a federal official to hold office is to sue at law in the Court of Claims
for salary. Such a remedy is plain, adequate, and complete."
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had to begin again in another court because the Court of Claims
has no jurisdiction to determine the title to office. However, since
194625 the court has conveniently ignored the reasoning of the
earlier decisions and without considering whether or not the claimant has in fact been replaced has, in several cases,26 allowed a civil
servant removed in violation of a statutory provision to recover
his compensation.
Again, many employees have fallen at the final hurdle when the
government met them with the defense of laches.27 Admittedly,
no matter however unjust and unwarranted the removal or suspension of a public officer may be, public policy requires that he
should promptly take any action necessary to assert his rights28
to the end that, if he is successful in his action, the government
service may be disturbed as little as possible and two salaries shall
not be paid for a single service. 29 But to foreclose relief on this
ground when the delay amounted to a few months only indicates
unnecessary solicitude for the government's interests.80
The federal employee also encounters difficulties if he commences an action in the district court. His available remedies are
quo warranto, mandamus and injunction depending on the circumstances of the case. Quo warranto has long been considered
25 Elchibegoff v. United States,
26 Simon v. United States, 113

106 Ct. Cl. 541 (1946).
Ct. Cl. 182 (1949); Gadsden v. United States, 111 Ct.
Cl. 487, 78 F. Supp. 126 (1948). Reinstatement of the employee or an offer to do so is
not a prerequisite to recovery. See Blackmar v. United States, 128 Ct. Cl. 693, 120 F. Supp.
408 (1954).
27 The employee must also, of course, be careful to join all interested persons or
bodies as parties to the action. Thus, the superior officer is an indispensable party if the
decree granting the relief sought will require him to take action, either by exercising a
power lodged in him or having a subordinate exercise it for him. See Williams v. Fanning,
332 U.S. 490, 68 S.Ct. 188 (1947).
28 Caswell v. Morgenthau, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 98 F. (2d) 296 (eighteen months delay too
long); United States ex rel. Arant v. Lane, 249 U.S. 367, 39 S.Ct. 293 (1919) (twenty months
too long).
29 Farley v. Abbetmeier, (D.C. Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 569. But it may reasonably be
argued that (1) the government has itself done wrong in paying A's salary to B, and (2)
in the case where the office has not been filled, the government is also paying a salary
for no service.
so Thus, in Norris v. United States, 257 U.S. 77 at 81, 42 S.Ct. 9 (1921), eleven months
delay was considered too long as the facts did not disclose "that exercise of reasonable
diligence .•. which the law imposes upon him as a duty if he would recover compensation for services in an office which the Government might fill with another.•.." But
it was found that Norris was ready, willing and able to discharge the duties of the office
at all times, and eleven months delay does not seem very long when we bear in mind
that his discharge had occurred only six months after the enactment of the statute guaranteeing him notice and a chance to answer.
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the proper remedy for trying title to a public office. 31 But the
absence of cases in which it has been utilized indicates that its
practical value is slight. The two main disadvantages32 of bringing a quo warranto action are that it is not available where no
successor has been named, as the present incumbent is the proper
party defendant,33 and that, although the judgment in quo warranto provides for the ouster of the defendant, it is very doubtful
if it can secure the reinstatement of the removed officer.34
Where quo warranto does not afford the desired relief mandamus is the proper legal remedy for seeking restoration to office.
It too is hedged around with procedural niceties which frequently
prove fatal to petitioning government employees. In the first
place, district courts of the United States other than the district
court of the District of Columbia35 have no jurisdiction to hear
original claims for a writ of mandamus,36 nor will an action seeking similar relief fare any better if dressed up as a mandatory injunction37 or a declaratory judgment38 because the courts cannot
do indirectly what they have no authority to do directly. 39 Secondly, the writ is not available where someone is in de jure,40
or apparently even de facto41 possession of the office, as in such
31 See comment, 30 ILL. L. REv. 1037 at 1045 ff. (1936).
32 Another drawback is that, absent statutory provision,

quo warranto does not lie in
respect of an employment as distinguished from an office. See FERRIS, EXTRAORDINARY
LEGAL REMEDIES 166-167 (1926); 2 BAILEY, HABEAS CORPUS 1259-1260 (1913).
33 This follows from United States v. Malmin, (3d Cir. 1921) 272 F. 785. And see
FERRIS, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES 148 (1926).
34 Although it has been argued that quo warranto can restore a removed officer to
his office [30 ILL. L. REv. 1037 at 1050-1051 (1936)], it appears that this is not so. See
Kalbfus v. Siddons, 42 App. D.C. 310 at 319-321 (1941); Priddie v. Thompson, (C.C. W.Va.
1897) 82 F. 186 at 189.
35 United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378 (1880); Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. (37
U.S.) 524 (1838).
36 Petrowski v. Nutt, (9th Cir. 1947) 161 F. (2d) 938. The reason for this lack of
jurisdiction is the absence of constitutional or statutory provisions conferring authority
to issue such writs. The district court of the District of Columbia is in a special position.
The court, in addition to being a federal court, is also charged with the enforcement of
the domestic law, and by the Act of 1801 (2 Stat. L. 103) creating the courts, it inherited
jurisdiction in accordance with the laws of the State of Maryland then existing in the
ceded area, which includes jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus in original proceedings.
37 Alley v. Craig, (D.C. Me. 1951) 97 F. Supp. 576.
38 Palmer v. Walsh, (D.C. Ore. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 64.
39 Ibid. And see Fredericks v. Rossell, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 95 F. Supp. 754.
40 United States v. Malmin, (3d Cir. 1921) 272 F. 785 at 790-791; United States ex
rel. Crow v. Mitchell, (D.C. Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 805 at 809. Contra, Kalbfus v. Siddons,
42 App. D.C. 310 (1914).
41 People ex rel. McLaughlin v. Board of Police, 1J4 N.Y. 450, 67 N.E. 78 (1~03)
[cited in United States ex rel. Crow v. Mitchell, (D.C. Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 805]; Uruted
States v. Malmin, (3d Cir. 1921) 272 F. 785 at 791.
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a case the title to office is in dispute and is within the province
of quo warranto.
Again, ·the issue of a writ lies in the discretion of the court42
and it is not demandable as of right; and its effectiveness has been
circumscribed by the reluctance of the courts to interfere in the
affairs of the executive branch of the government.43 Consequently, the writ will not norm~lly issue unless the duty of the officer
to act is clearly established and plainly defined and unless the obligation to act is preemptory.44 But, the judicial aura of protection of official actions of the executive branch of the government
should not prevent mandamus issuing where an officer has wrongly
interpreted the law when performing an official duty. Earlier
cases45 suggested that mandamus could never control an executive
·officer in such a case, but there is a hint in a more recent case46
that an officer's interpretation of the law may be questioned if it
is clearly wrong and the official action is arbitrary and capricious.
This is a move in the right direction because, admitting that
mandamus should not issue against an administrative officer where
an exercise of judgment or discretion is necessary in determining
his duty, it is equally clear that an officer should not be able to
rely upon the mere necessity of reading the statutes in respect of
their applicability to facts before him and thereby, under the
claim of exercising discretion, avoid plain duty.47
42 United States v. Malmin,
43 E.g., United States ex rel.

(3d Cir. 1921) 272 F. 785 at 789.
Crow v. Mitchell, (D.C. Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 805 at 809810: " ... courts always should proceed with extreme caution where the granting of the
writ would result in interference by the judicial department with the management of the
executive department of the government . . . even where the petition for the writ is to
perform a purely ministerial act•... " And see Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. (39 U.S.) 497
at 515-516 (1840); Borak v. Biddle, (D.C. Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 278. In view of this
rather natural deference to ~e executive and under its discretionary power to refuse to
issue the writ, the court would probably never mandamus the PresidenL See comment, 30
!LL. L. REv. 1037 at 1052-1053 (1936) where the matter is fully discussed.
44 Hammond v. Hull, (D.C. Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 23 at 25. Furthermore, it is only
in clear cases of the illegality of action that courts will intervene to displace the judgments
of administrative officers or bodies.
45 United States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U.S. 40, 9 S.Ct. 12 (1888); United States
ex rel. Crow v. Mitchell, (D.C. Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 805 at 809.
46 Hammond v. Hull, (D.C. Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 23 at 25.
47 United States ex rel. Rhodes v. Helvering, (D.C. Cir. 1936) 84 F. (2d) 270 at 272,
per Stephens, C.J., dissenting. And see Roberts v. United States, 176 U.S. 221, 20 S.CL
376 (1900). In Ginn v. United States, 110 Ct. Cl. 637 (1948), Ginn, who had· been suspended from duty without pay for over a year pending investigation and decision of his
citizenship and charges of fraudulent conduct in connection therewith, was held not
entitled to recover his salary although the citizenship questions were resolved in his favor
by another court, because of the commissioner's discretionary power to remove (and
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Finally, the practical value of a successful action for a writ
of mandamus is not very great. If the writ is granted because of
the failure to satisfy the procedural requirements relating to removal, it is no trouble for the appropriate officer immediately to
dismiss the employee, this time taking care to follow the prescribed procedure.48 It is obvious then that mandamus is not the
panacea which the court of appeals claimed it to be in Kalbfus
v. Siddons.49
Certiorari is not the proper remedy to obtain reinstatement
into office,50 and prohibition will probably not lie in such a case.
Although there is a conflict of authority in state courts51 it seems
that federal courts would refuse to issue the writ on the grounds
that the officer or board in hearing charges against a government
servant and conducting proceedings for his removal acts in an
executive rather than in a judicial capacity.52
The other remedy available to the government employee is
to seek an injunction.and, although the advantages of being able
to enjoin a proposed and unjustified removal over other remedies
are obvious, the practical value of this type of relief is limited by
two factors. In a succession of cases53 at the turn of the century
incidentally, suspend) for cause. But, should this be so if the cause involved solely a
question of law and the officer came to a wrong conclusion in law, for it is ludicrous to
say that the fact of having had a question as to his citizenship raised may constitute
reasonable cause for removing an employee. See note 17 supra.
48 See Kaufman
49 42 App. D.C.

v. United States, 118 Ct. Cl. 91 at 104, 93 F. Supp. 1019 (1950).
310 (1914). It was asserted in that case that mandamus is the complete remedy and it was .said, too, that it could aid a person illegally removed from office
without notice and hearing since, the order of removal being void, the attempted appointment of a successor is a nullity.
50 Because, on the one hand, the purpose of certiorari is to bring for review before a
superior court the proceedings and judgments of inferior courts and tribunals clothed
with authority to act judicially and, on the other hand, certiorari will not normally lie
when there is another adequate remedy. See generally FERRIS, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL
REMEDIES, Part III (1926).
51 See 115 A.L.R. 3 at 28 (1938).
52 But in that legal "white elephant," Kalbfus v. Siddons, 42 App. D.C. 210 (1914), it
was held that proceedings for the removal of a public officer are adversary or judicial in
character and, if the organic law of the governmental entity is silent as to the mode of
procedure, that the substantial principles of the common law as to proceedings affecting
private rights must be observed.
53 Morgan v. Nunn, (C.C. Tenn. 1898) 84 F. 551; Page v. Moffett, (C.C. N.J. 1898) 85
F. 38; Taylor v. Kercheval, (C.C. Ind. 1897) 82 F. 497; Flemming v. Stahl, (C.C. Ark.
1897) 83 F. 940; Couper v. Smyth, (C.C. Ga. 1897) 84 F. 757. Two contrary decisions were
given by Jackson, D.J., in Priddie v. Thompson, (C.C. W.Va. 1897) 82 F. 186, and Butler
v. White, (C.C. W.Va. 1897) 83 F. 578, but the latter case was reversed on appeal [171
U.S. 379, 18 S.Ct. 949 (1898)].
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it was held that a court of equity could not enjoin an officer or
board from removing officers, particularly where the removal
was in the discretion of the removing authority. The decisions
were based partly on the ground that the removed officer was
presumed to have adequate protection by mandamus or quo warranto if he wished to contest the validity of his removal or the
right of his successor to the office, and partly on the ground that
equity could protect only property rights,54 and an officer had no
such rights in his office.55
At the present time, however, the chief reason why injunctions
are of such little use is that all administrative remedies must usually be exhausted before a writ will issue56 and, in the case of a
removal from office, by that time it is too late. There is one
exception to this which, though couched in general terms, has
thus far been applied only in reduction in force cases. It has been
held that, where the evidence tended to show that the removal
of civil servants from their positions with the Veterans Administration would be in violation of their rights under the Veterans
Preference Act, the civil servants, who were faced with immediate
discharge, were not required to exhaust administrative remedies
prior to :institution of their actions for declaratory judgments declaring their proposed removal to be void.57 It is not easy to
reconcile this exercise of jurisdiction with the refusal of jurisdiction in earlier cases, unless we say that rights have so~e quality
of "property". when granted by a statute which they lack when
set forth in the Civil Service Regulations.58 It may well be due
54 Applying In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200, 8 S.Ct. 482 (1888).
55 In Page v. Moffett, (C.C. N.J. 1898) 85 F. 38, the court

went so far as to say that,
while the President has the constitutional power to make regulations controlling the
removal power of his subordinates, such regulations could never be regarded as laws
because they were subject to modification or revocation at his whim.
56 Asher v. Forrestal, (D.C. D.C. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 470; Hammond v. Hull, (D.C. Cir.
1942) 131 F. (2d) 23 at 25.
57 Reeber v. Rossell, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 108; Wettre v. Hague, (1st Cir.
1948) 168 F. (2d) 825; Farrell v. Moomau, (D.C. Cal. 1948) 85 F. Supp. 125. And see
Fischer v. Haeberle, (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 652. But cf. Longfellow v. Gudger,
(D.C. Cir. 1926) 16 F. (2d) 653, where the requirement that employees with military
preferences should be the last dismissed was completely disregarded and the plaintiff had
no remedy from the courts.
58 In Wettre v. Hague, (1st Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 825 at 826, the court was content
to adopt a citation from Order of Railway Conductors of America v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561
at 566, 66 S.Ct. 322 (1946) that, "Of course, where the statute is so obviously violated that
a 'sacrifice or obliteration of a right which Congress .•• created' to protect the interest
of individuals or the public is clearly shown, a court of equity could, in a proper case,
intervene."
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to a question of interpretation. Regulations confer some discretion on the Civil Service Commission and the courts may have
considered that, in view of the discretionary nature of the regulations, the "rights" were not set forth clearly enough to justify
judicial interference in executive affairs.
The protection of the Civil Service Act applies to all persons
in the classified civil service but it is a simple matter for Congress
or the President to exclude particular classes of civil servants from
the benefits of those statutory provisions designed to prevent arbitrary removals. In order to be in the classified civil service a person must not only have a competitive status but must also be in
the service.59 Competitive status is one which permits promotion,
transfer, reassignment or reinstatement without competitive examination60 and is usually acquired by receiving a probationary
appointment after having passed a competitive examination. A
person is in the classified civil service when he has a competitive
status and occupies a classified position in the executive branch
of the government. 61 All persons in the executive branch of the
government are in the classified civil service unless excluded by
statute or executive order, 62 but the Civil Service Commission has
power to except positions from the classified service. 63 Furthermore, on the basis of an opinion of an attorney general64 it seemed
that the President might at any tirrie circumvent the restrictions
on removal imposed by the act by placing positions, the occupants
of which in theory still retain their civil service status, under the
several schedules to the statute. 65 The control is not as to indi50 See generally Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46 at 52-54, affirmed
by equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918, 71 S.Ct. 669 (1951). The term service refers to
positions or offices; classified service, competitive service, classified (competitive) service, and
classified civil service are interchangeable terms.
60 5 C.F.R. §4.301 (a)5 (1949).
61 5 C.F.R. §4.301 (a)4 (1949).
62 But temporary appointees and probationers are excepted from the classified service
[5 C.F.R. §§2.113 (a), 2.114 (a), 9.103, and §§2.114, 9.102 (a), 22.1 (a) (1949) as amended].
However, regulations also confer the benefit of the civil service statute on employees
having competitive status and occupying positions which though excepted from the
classified civil service either by statute or executive order are not of a confidential or
policy-determining character [5 C.F.R. §§9.101 (b) (1), 9.102 (a) (1949) as amended] and
also on those employees who hold indefinite appointments to positions in the classified
civil service whether or not they have competitive status [5 C.F.R. §2.ll4 (h)].
63 5 C.F.R. §§6.l to 6.300 (1949) as amended.
64 37 Op. Atty. Gen. 567 (1934).
65 When a position is excepted from the competitive civil service under authority of
an executive order, it is placed on Schedules A, B, or C, and it will depend on which
schedule the position is what civil service rules and regulations are applicable. Of course,
absent a statutory provision, the President may by executive order transfer a position from
one schedule to another or reclassify it back into the competitive civil service.
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viduals but as to classes of government servants. But, the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently held in Roth v.
Brownell66 that, even though positions had been excepted by the
President from the provisions of the civil service statute, the
removal procedures of that act still applied to the incumbents of
the positions. Congress could, of course, afford even greater protection to civil servants in this regard but, as a concomitant of
this power, it could also at any time abolish positions or achieve
the same result as far as the displaced employee is concerned by
shortening his term of appointment to office sufficiently to make
it expire.

C.

Some Loyalty Problems

As was indicated earlier a civil servant's "lot is not a happy
one," but insecurity of tenure has been aggravated by the implementation_ of the loyalty program designed to remove from the
government service those persons whose loyalty to the United
States is doubtful. We have already noted the Hatch Act, the purpose of which is to restrict the political activities of government
servants,67 and the statute authorizing the suspension and removal
for security reasons of persons in particular departments. That
statute may generally be considered to apply to certain "sensitive
positions" in the government service, 68 but it should be noted
that if implemented to cover the whole of the civil service (and
the unfettered power of doing this is lodged in the President69 ),
it would have the effect of scrapping the merit system in government employment.
However, most problems arise under the executive orders
issued in 194770 and 1953. 71 The earlier order was issued by
President Truman and provided for the refusal of employment
and the removal from the government service where "on all the
evidence there is a reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person
involved to the Government of the United States." 72 The stand66 (D.C. Cir. 1954) 215 F. (2d) 500.
67 Note 5 supra.
68 Note 9 supra.
69 64 Stat. L. 477, §3 (1950), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §22 (3).
70 No. 9835 dated March 21, 1947, amended by Exec.

Order No. 10241 dated April 28,

1951.
71 No.

10450 dated April 27, 1953, amended by Exec. Order No. 10491 dated Oct. 13,

1953.
72 Supra

note 70, Part V, §1.
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ard set by the 1953 order which supplanted the earlier one is
that the termination of the employment is, in the opinion of the
head of the department or agency concerned, "necessary or advisable in the interests of the national security." 73 Thus the government has a wider discretion under the later order and, conversely, under it the civil servant has less protection than under
the 1947 order. Under both the old and the current order certain
activities and associations of the employee or applicant for employment are considered in this connection. The only three of
these which need concern us at all here are (I) serving "the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the
United States," (2) "sympathetic association with . . . any representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical
to the interests of the United States," and (3) "membership in,
or affiliation or sympathetic association with, any foreign or
domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons which is totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or which . . . seeks to alter the form of government of
the United States by unconstitutional means."74
But, rather than consider these provisions at this stage it will
be more useful to analyze the constitutional issues under the following heads: (I) the President's power to issue the orders; (2)
their constitutionality under the First Amendment; (3) the possible application to them or to either of them of the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment; (4) their validity in the light
of the provisions of the Sixth Amendment. The two executive
orders do not require separate treatment since they differ in
detail and not in principle and, for the sake of simplicity, the
terms "order" or "executive order" when used in the following
analysis may be taken to refer to either or both of the orders.
I. The first c<?nstitutional question is the source of the President's power to issue the order. The broadest basis for this is the
executive power, and in M-yers v. United States,7 5 as modified by
Humphrey's Executor (Rathbun) v. United States,7 6 the Supreme
Court emphasized that, under his duty to supervise the administration of the executive branch of the government, the President
73 Supra note 71, §6. The section provides for suspension and then either reinstatement or removal in accordance with the prescribed procedure (§1).
74 Id., now §8.
75 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21 (1926).
76 295 U.S. 602, 55 S.Ct. 869 (1935).
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has an illimitable power of removal of persons filling predominantly executive positions in the government service.77 This
power of removal does not directly78 extend to include the vast
majority of government servants who are either inferior officers
appointed by the President alone, the courts of law or the heads
of departments, or employees of the United States wherever Congress has vested their appointment. It may be noted too that
Congress may prescribe the conditions of employment and limit
the grounds of removal of such government servants.79
But these restrictions would .not appear to affect the President's power to promulgate the executive order as he also has a
twin statutory source of power. First, the Hatch Act provides for
the removal of federal servants who are members of organizations
advocating the overthrow by force of the constitutional form of
government,80 and a 1950 statute81 provides for the suspension
and removal of persons in certain departments and agencies for
national security reasons. Secondly, under the 1871 statute the
President may "prescribe such regulations for the admission of
persons into the civil service of the United States as may best promote the efficiency thereof, and ascertain the fitness of each candidate in respect to age, health, character, knowledge, and ability."82
Under the 1883 act he may promulgate regulations prepared by
the Civil Service Commission necessary for the establishment and
maintenance of the merit system. 83 But, there is a limit to his
powers in this regard in that the 1912 amendment to the civil
service statute restricts the removal of persons in the classified
77 Myers' case applied this principle to all executive officers, but in Rathbun's case it
was held that the President's illimitable removal power did not extend to persons in
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial positions in government. Thus, the President's removal
power extends to all persons performing predominantly executive functions. Of course,
Congress may, under the civil service laws, deprive the President of the power to remove
minor officers and employees. See generally CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS
428, n. 80 (1948).
78 It is clear that Congress may deprive the President of his power of removal except
in the case of officers whose appointments are made by him with the consent of the
Senate [See Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 225 (1839); United States v. Perkins, 116
U.S. 483, 6 S.Ct. 449 (1886)]. But_ the President, by bringing pressure to bear upon the
appropriate departmental head, may achieve the desired result indirectly.
79 E.g., see United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947); Ex
parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, I S.Ct. 381 (1882); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct.
21 (1926).
80 See note 5 supra, §9A (1).
8164 Stat. L. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §22.
82 Rev. Stat. §1753 (1875), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §631.
8_3 22 Stat. L. 403 (1883), 5 U.S.C. (1952) §633.
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civil service to "such cause as will promote the efficiency of said
service. " 84
While in view of these provisions an order designed to secure
the removal of a certain ·class of government servants because of
their political beliefs would be ultra vires the statutory rulemaking power (and to a certain extent in conflict with one of the
Civil Service Rules85 ), presidential regulations, aimed at ridding
the government of persons as to whose loyalty there is a reasonable
doubt, have been rightly upheld.86 The true rationale for this
is that discharge of or refusal of employment to such persons has
a reasonable relation to the promotion of the efficiency of the
service.87 On this view the executive order cannot be assailed as
a usurpation of legislative power8 8 and the standards for employment in, and removal from, the government prescribed therein
must therefore be attacked on the constitutionality of their content
rather than on the validity of their origin.
2. The guarantees of the First Amendment have always been
held to include freedom of political thought and expression,89 but
84 See note
85 5 C.F.R.

6 supra, at 555.
(Supp. 1955) §04.2: "No person employed in the executive branch of the
Federal Government who has authority to take or recommend any personnel action with
respect to any person who is an employee in the competitive service or any eligible or
applicant for a position in the competitive service shall make any inquiry concerning
the race, political affiliation or religious beliefs of any such employee, eligible, or applicant. All disclosures concerning such matters shall be ignored, except as to such membership in political parties or organizations as constitutes by law a disqualification for Government employment. No discrimination shall be exeri;:ised, threatened, or promised by
any person in the executive branch of the Federal Government against or in favor of any
employee in the competitive service, or any eligible or applicant for a position in the
competitive service because of his race, political affiliation or religious beliefs, except as
may be authorized or required by law.''
86 In Friedman v. Schwellenbach, (D.C. Cir. 1946) 159 F. (2d) 22, it was held that a
war service regulation permitting the removal from the federal service of one concerning
whose loyalty to the government the Civil Service Commission entertained a reasonable
doubt, was reasonable and proper and the making thereof was within the scope of the
authority conferred on the Commission by the civil service act and certain executive orders.
Likewise see Washington v. Clark, (D.C. D.C. 1949) 84 F. Supp. 964; and Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46. However, in Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 at
350, 75 S.Ct. 790 (1955), Black, J., expressed grave doubts as to whether the presidential
order had been authorized by an act of Congress and furthermore doubted if Congress
could have given the President such a power.
87 Friedman v. Schwellenbach, (D.C. Cir. 1946) 159 F. (2d) 22. In Kutcher v. Gray,
(D.C. Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 783 at 786, it was specifically held that "the efficiency of the
service" would be promoted by the removal of a disloyal federal civil service employee.
88 Contra, "The Constitutional Right to Advocate Political, Social and Economic
Change-An Essential of American Democracy," 7 LAW. GUILD. REv. 57 at 69 (1947).
89 E.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 at 369, 51 S.Ct. 532 (1931), per Hughes,
C.J.: "The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that
government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained
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none of the First Amendment liberties are absolutes90 and, in any
case, the amendment prohibits only congressional action.91 Nevertheless, it seems clear that the First Amendment operates indirectly as a limitation on the executive as well as on the legislative
power and, consequently, the executive order must be subject to
its restrictions. Insofar as the executive order represents the exercise of the President's statutory rule-making power, it is obviously
subject to the First Amendment.92 Again, it may reasonably be
argued in the light of dicta in earlier decisions93 that, insofar as it
represents an exercise of the executive power granted to the President by the Constitution, it is subject to a like restriction. Alternatively, the First Amendment will be applicable if there is any
foundation for the invocation of the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment. For it has been held by a lower court that
each liberty specified in the First Amendment is a liberty which
is- secured to all persons by the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment.94 .:lt may also be maintained that, although the "liberty" guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment is different from the
"liberty" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the due
process clause of the former amendment should apply to executive
action and render the First Amendment applicable. Certainly
there have been frequent holdings that the due process clause of
by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system."
90 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 at 571-572, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942). In
more recent decisions [e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857 (1951);
13eauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725 (1952)] the Supreme Court has retreated
from the position that freedom of speech and expression occupies a preferred place in
the constitutional scheme. For, as Jackson, J., succinctly remarked in 13rinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160 at 180, 69 S.Ct. 1302 (1949), "We cannot give some constitutional
rights a preferred position without relegating others to a deferred position." And see
Frankfurter, J., in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 at 88, 69 S.Ct. 448 (1949). In practice,
• what is meant by the preferred place of First Amendment freedoms is that the government must show that it had reasonable grounds to pass any statute abridging such freedoms, i.e., it is more a question of the burden of proof than a presumption of validity
or invalidity.
91 U.S. CoNsr., amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
92 And see Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 65 S.Ct. 208 (1944).
93 Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2 at 124-125 (1866); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S.
I at 25, 63 S.Ct. I (1942). This power was presumed by the court to exist in Washington
v. Clark, (D.C. D.C. 1949) 84 F. Supp. 964, and Dailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182
F. (2d) 46.
94 United States v. Komer, (D.C. Cal. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 242.
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the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the First Amendment95
and that it restricts all state action whether legislative, judicial or
executive.96
As we have already intimated, the First Amendment does not
give an absolute right to freedom of speech, assembly, or of political expression.97 In the case of the government servant restrictions on those rights have been justified from two points of view.98
The first is that by accepting government employment a person
may have to waive certain rights which he would otherwise have
as an ordinary citizen. While this approach has the authority of
Justice Holmes' famous epigram that a person "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right
to be a policeman,"99 it is specious and, although constantly appearing in the judgments of the courts, is not justified by the
decisions themselves. In fact, the courts have always required
that any encroachment upon the liberties of government servants
should bear a reasonable relation to proper governmental activities.100
The fallacy in the first approach lies in the attempt to treat
the government as an ordinary employer of labor. The point is
that the federal government derives its powers from the Constitution and, as shown by the decision of the Court in United Public
Workers v. Mitchell/0 1 the Constitution does not authorize discrimination against federal employees in the exercise of personal
freedoms. Admittedly, the government, as any other employer,
is under no obligation to hire as an employee anyone who does
not come up to certain standards. Nevertheless, not only must the
same basic standard be applied to all comers102 but also the stand95 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 at 666, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925).
96E.g., Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S.Ct. 255 (1937).
97 See note 90 supra.
98 See generally note, 47 CoL. L. REv. 1161 (1947).
99 McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216 at 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
100 E.g., United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947). Indeed
in McAuliffe's case Holmes, J., appeared to recognize the same qualification for he said
(supra note 99, at 220): "On the same principle, the city may impose any reasonable
condition upon holding offices within its control. This condition seems to us reasonable,
if that be a question open to revision here."
101 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947).
1021bid.
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ards set must meet the test of reasonableness and appropriateness.103
The second point of view is that certain limitations may always be imposed on the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.
But, as the United Public Workers case104 shows, the test for the
validity of restrictions on government employees' activities in this
direction is not the commonly applied clear-and-present-danger
test but is the criterion of reasonable relation. In the first place,
it was indicated in American Communications Association v.
Douds105 that the clear-and-present-danger test is confined to cases
where the government's objective is to curtail speech for its own
sake and on that reasoning it was not available in the United
Public Workers case. Secondly, the dissents of Justices Black and
Douglas overlook the long history of regulations designed to promote impartiality in the civil service and the application to them
of the "reasonableness" test in Ex parte Curtis.106 Thirdly, there
are numerous areas where the Supreme Court has deferred to
the legislative judgment and ignored the clear-and-present-danger
test, adopting instead the criterion of reasonableness.107 Finally,
it may be pointed out that the loyalty program was not initiated
to control political beliefs but to ensure against the infiltration
and retention in government employment of persons whose loyalty
could reasonably be doubted or whose presence there might not
be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security.
It can hardly be denied that the program bears a reasonable relation to the admittedly proper purpose of ensuring that the gov·ernment of the country is managed by persons of unquestionable
103 See note 100 supra. Of course, it is clear that the Executive can discriminate for
political reasons in selecting personnel. See Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F.
(2d) 46 at 63. Thus, a Republican president _may appoint few, if any, Democrats to office
without violating any provision of the Constitution.
104 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1946).
105 339 U.S. 382 at 396, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950).
106 106 U.S. 371, 1 S.Ct. 381 (1882). Admittedly Curtis' case was decided before
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 (1919), where the clear-and-present
danger test was first applied.
101 See (1) Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193 (1944); and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct. 1375 (1943) and like Japanese exclusion
cases based on national self-preservation in wartime; (2) Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333,
10 S.Ct. 299 (1890) (statute denying polygamists or members of such an organization the
right to vote and to hold office upheld); (3) Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25
S.Ct. 358 (1905) (upholding constitutionality of compulsory vaccination provision even
though it restricted liberty of the person). And see Friedman v. Schwellenbach, (D.C.
Cir. 1946) 159 F. (2d) 22.
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loyalty,10 8 and so the public interest in a loyal and efficient civil
service will outbalance the public interest in freedom of speech.109
3. Even if we assume for the moment that there is a foundation for the invocation of the clause, it seems that to attack the
executive order as violative of due process affords little more
chance of success. The three objections which could be raised
are that it imputes guilt by association, that it is void for vagueness, and that it does not satisfy procedural due process requirements.
Admittedly, if membership in one of the listed organizations
were in itself taken to establish a reasonable ground for belief
in an employee's lack of loyalty, guilt by association, which has
been considered as violating "one of the most fundamental principles of our jurisprudence,"110 would result. However, proceedings under the loyalty program are not criminal and it would
seem from the cases that they are not sufficiently analogous to
criminal proceedings to warrant the application of a principle
which has thus far been restricted to criminal proceedings.111 In
any case both the President112 and an attorney general113 have
emphasized that membership in, affiliation or sympathetic association with, a designated organization is simply one piece of
evidence which may or may not be helpful in arriving at a conclusion as to the action which is to be taken in a particular case.
In a recent decision114 a federal civil service employee had been
10s In Friedman v. Schwellenbach, (D.C. Cir. 1946) 159 F. (2<l) 22, the court squarely
held that an employee may be dismissed because of his views, opinions, or affiliations, and
in so doing clearly applied the reasonable relation test. See Washington v. Clark, (D.C.
D.C. 1949) 84 F. Supp. 964; Sherman, "Loyalty and the Civil Servant," 20 ROCKY MT. L.
REv. 381 (1948) (advocating the application of the clear and present danger test);
Emerson and Helfeld, "Loyalty Among Government Employees," 58 YALE L.J. I at 85 ff.
(1948).
109 Chafee suggests that the boundary line of the First Amendment should be fixed
by the balancing of the two very important social interests in the search for truth and in
the public safety. See CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 35 (1948).
110 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 at 163, 65 S.Ct. 1443 (1945). See, too, Schneiderman
v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 at 136 and at 154, 63 S.Ct. 1333 (1943); and Kotteakos v.
United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239 (1945), where it was said at 772: "Guilt with us
remains individual and personal, even as respects conspiracies. It is not a matter of mass
application."'
·
111 This follows from our discussion of the applicability of the Sixth Amendment
below.
112 5 C.F.R. §200.1 (1949), revoked, 18 FED. REG. 5699 (Sept. 25, 1953).
113 Letter to Loyalty Review Board quoted in Kutcher v. Gray, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 199
F. (2d) 783 at 788.
114 Kutcher v. Gray, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 783. The memorandum of the
Loyalty Review Board was void because it was ultra vires the statutory rule-making
authority of the Board. It was on the same grounds that the Court decided the first case
of Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 71 S.Ct. 624 (1951).
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discharged in pursuance of a Loyalty Review Board memorandum
ordaining removal on a finding that he was a member of an organization which had been designated by the attorney general as an
organization seeking to overthrow the United States Government
by unconstitutional means. The court of appeals held the discharge to be improper (and the memorandum to be absolutely
void) in the absence of a specific finding by the administrator of
the agency in which the employee worked that, upon such evidence, reasonable grounds existed for a belief that the employee
was disloyal to the United States.
Nor can the executive order be impugned on the ground of
vagueness. Although a statute will be void for vagueness when
the courts feel that it sets no standards at all115 or amounts to the
delegation of legislative power to non-legislative bodies,11 6 and
although the courts have been inclined to prescribe higher standards of definiteness and certainty in the case of legislation affecting civil and political rights,117 this contention should receive
short shrift. First, this is executive and not legislative delegation
and, in view of the scope of his duties, it cannot plausibly be
maintained that the President's directives to his own agents should
conform to legally ascertainable standards of certainty. Secondly,
the terms "communist," "fascist," "subversive," "totalitarian,"
"sympathetic association" arid- "affiliation," which may be considered too indefinite, are used with reference to organizations
which are publicly liste.d by the attorney general.11 8 Furthermore, the attorney general can be required at the suit of such an
organization to show a reasonable basis for making the designation.119 This should constitute adequate notice. The only other
terms which may be questioned are "loyalty" and "interests of
national security." The former term may have many meanings
but, since it has thus far defied acceptable definition and since it
is obvious that disloyal employees should not be retained in the
government service,120 it seems straining at gnats to attack the
115 United States v. Cohen Grocery, 255 U.S. 81, 41 S.Ct. 298 (1921); Stromberg v.
California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532 (1931). For a general discussion on this point see
note, 47 CoL. L. REv. 1161 at 1170-1171 (1947).
116 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 55 S.Ct. 837 (1935).
117 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 at 101, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940).
118 The publicity requirement is imposed under ,i3 of Part ill of the former 1947
order and by §12. of the 1953 order. See notes 70-71 supra.
119 See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, (D.C. D.C. 1952) 104 F.
Supp. 567.
120 This was clearly the view of the court in such cases as Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C.
Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46, and Friedman v. Schwellenbach, (D.C. Cir. 1946) 159 F. (2d) 22.
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order on this ground. The latter term may sound more vague but
less stigma should attach to a removal thereunder since disloyalty
is not the only ground, and it too should escape condemnation on
the score of vagueness.
Likewise it seems to be too late now to assail the order as
violating procedural due process. The courts have always treated
the removal of government servants as an executive and not as a
judicial or quasi-judicial matter.121 We saw earlier in this article
that the courts will not interfere provided the prescribed procedure is followed and provided there is no lack of good faith.
The justification for this is more firmly founded than in the
simple disinclination of the judiciary to meddle in the affairs of
the executive branch of the government. It springs from the
principle of inherent discretionary power reposing in the President enunciated in the Myers case,122 the exercise of which power
would be inconsistent with a non-statutory requirement of compliance with due process of law in such matters as adequacy of
evidence and disclosure of names and the like. It should be noted,
however, that, in line with their usual practice,123 the courts will
insist on the scrupulous observance of the procedural requirements
of the executive order. In Deak v. Pace,12 4 which effectively limits
the implications of some of the dicta in Bailey v. Richardson, an
order of the Secretary of War removing civilian employees of the
War Department from service on the ground that such action
was warranted by demands of national security, in that the employees allegedly attended Communist meetings and were interested in communist activities, was held not to comply with the
statute requiring the employees to be informed with reasonable
certainty and precision of the cause for removal, where no details
as to times, places and organizations were furnished. 125 The terms
Thus, in Kutcher v. Gray, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 783 at 786, it was said, ", .• it cannot be argued that removal of a disloyal employee is not promotive of the 'efficiency of
the service.' "
121 See discussion supra and Washington v. Clark, (D.C. D.C. 1949) 84 F. Supp. 964,
which involved the loyalty program.
122 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 47 S.Ct. 21 (1926).
123 See note 13 supra.
124 (D.C. Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 997.
125 It is quite possible that, should the question arise, the Court would overrule the
decision in Deak v. Pace, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 997. Prettyman, C.J., in his dissenting opinion, which closely follows the reasoning of the court in Bailey v. Richardson,
(D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46, argues that the court could not force the Secretary of the
Army to furnish "additional information" because the decision as to what data should be
furnished lay in his judgment as to the national security. The court should not take it
upon itself to decide that the "additional information" which it required to be furnished
would not involve any security risk.
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of the controlling statute· in that case are so similar to those of
both the executive orders, and in fact are identical with those of
the current order, that the requirement of some reasonable measure of specificity of charges should apply to removals under the
loyalty program.
.
In order for the due process clause to be applicable to a situation there must be a deprivation of "life, liberty or property"12s.
and, except when considering procedural due process, we have
assumed thus far that the federal servant's "right" to his job comes
within this provision. In numerous cases it has been considered
that offices and employments are not property127 or contractua11 2 s
rights within the meaning and protection of the Constitution,
and the court of appeals in Bailey v. Richardson129 took this view
in holding that there was no foundation for the invocation of the
due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The effects of a dismissal under the loyalty program and the
removed employee's struggles to obtain employment thereafter
may be depicted in graphic and appealing colors.130 It may, therefore, be argued that the consequent loss of reputation amounts to
the deprivation of a substantial property right,1 31 and that this
is borne out by the fact that calling a person a communist or
communist sympathizer is libelous per se.132 It may be contended
that an administrative finding of disloyalty is equivalent to a
judicial verdict of treason in the eyes of the world, but the clear
fact remains that, if the government in the valid exercise of a
governmental power injures an individual, that person has no
redress.133 It is just as unte:qable to maintain that dismissals under
126 U.S. CoNsr., amend. V provides: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law•..."
127 E.g., Butler v. Pennsylvania, IO How. (51 U.S.) 402 (1850); Taylor and Marshall
v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 at 577, 20 S.Ct. 1009 (1900).
12s E.g., Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99, IO S.Ct. 431 (1890); Field v. Giegenack,
(D.C. Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 945.
129 Despite numerous dicta to the contrary in earlier cases [e.g., Marbury v. Madison,
I Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 at 162 (1803); Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 277 at
320 (1866)] the clear weight of authority supports the view taken by the court and it is
now too late to hope that the court will hold otherwise.
130 For a general discussion of the question, see the articles referred to in note 108
supra, and also Kaplan, "Loyalty Review of Federal Employees,'' 23 N.Y. UNIV. L.Q. REv.
437 (1948), and O'Brian, "Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association," 61 HARv. L. REv. 592
(1948).
.
131 See note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 107 at 156-158 (1951). Contra, Angilly v. United States,
(2d Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 642 at 644, per Augustus Hand, J.
132 Spane! v. Pegler, (7th Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 619 at _621, citing cases from other
jurisdictions.
133 United States v. Sanders, (10th Cir. 1944) 145 F. (2d) 458; Bailey v. Richardson,
(D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46; Cochran v. Couzens, (D.C. D.C. 1930) 42 F. (2d) 783
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the loyalty program must constitute an exception to the general
rule since they are damaging to reputation, subject the removed
employee to moral obloquy and are injurious to his prospects of
future employment. But, so are dismissals for accepting bribes,184
for repeated attempts at seduction by force,1 35 for malfeasance in
office; 136 yet the government's right to dismiss employees on those
grounds without the safeguards of due process has not been seriously questioned.
Again, it may be argued that there is no deprivation of liberty
because the government is entitled to insist on the continuing
faithfulness of its servants, and because those persons who are in
effect labeled as disloyal are still free to hold their particular
political philosophies outside government employment. For obvious reasons every citizen cannot demand that the government
employ him in some capacity. Nevertheless, this does not mean
that an applicant for a position and a person holding a position
have no rights. One reason for the failure to appreciate this
distinction is that the apparent lack of a ready remedy often connotes the nonexistence of a right. But this is not necessarily so.
Let us consider this first from the point. of view of the applicant for office. Both United States v. Lovett137 and Bailey v.
Richardson138 recognized that a bar to future employment may
amount to punishment-if a legislative act, such a bar may be a
bill of attainder,139 and if an executive act it may amount to
punishment within the meaning of, and so subject to, the Sixth
Amendment.140 This is not the whole answer. In the first place,
a qualification or disqualification must bear some reasonable relation to the advancement of the public welfare141 and, although
(holding that anyone may be attacked with impunity by a congressman while he is on the
floor of Congress).
134 Eberlein v. United States, 53 Ct. Cl. 466
135 Golding v. United States, 78 Ct. Cl. 682
136 Kent v. United States, 105 Ct. Cl. 280

(1918).
(1934).
(1946). And see Angilly v. United States,

(2d Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 642.
137 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946).
138 (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46.
139 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946).
140 Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46.
141 People v. Crane, 21.4 N.Y. 154 at 161, 108 N.E. 427 (1915), per Cardozo, J.: "Since
government, in expending public moneys, is expending the money of its citizens, it may
not by arbitrary discriminations having no relation to the public welfare, foster the
employment of one class of its citizens and discourage the employment of others." However, as we noted (supra note 103), the Executive can discriminate in public employment
for political reasons. Still, once a person is in the classified civil service, he can be
removed only under the provisions of the civil service statute.
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not material to the present inquiry, this does indicate that the
applicant for employment is not destitute of legal rights. Furthermore, though a person does not have an absolute right to a position
in the government service, yet as between himself and other
applicants he cannot be disqualified on illegal grounds.142 Thus,
Congress cannot provide that "no Republica:r;i, Jew or Negro shall
be appointed to federal office."143 In other words, a person has
the constitutional right to the opportunity to compete equally
with others for a position and not to be adjudged ineligible illegally. It may reasonably be argued that these rights should come
within the meaning of "liberty" in the due process clause.144
We may now consider in this light the position of a federal
servant. Like most aphorisms, Chief Justice Fuller's remark in
Crenshaw v. United States,1 45 that an officer enjoys a privilege
revocable by the sovereignty at will, is not completely ,accurate.
It has been suggested146 that, applying the principle that one may
be denied his liberty if he is punished for exercising it,147 removal
from office should come within this category when it is based
upon the exercise by the employee of a constitutional right. Thus,
in his concurring opinion in the recent case of Peters v. Hobby 148
(which, however, was decided by the Court on another ground149 ),
Justice Douglas said: "It [the practice of using "faceless informers"] deprives men of 'liberty' within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment, for one of men's most precious liberties is his right
to work. When a man is deprived of that 'liberty' without a fair
trial, he is denied due process." It is better,1 50 however, to approach the problem from the point of view of the "privilege" of
142 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 71 S.Ct. 624 (1951)
[citing Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 59 S.Ct. 884 (1939)]: "The fact that one may not have
a legal right to get or keep a government post does not mean that he can be adjudged
ineligible illegally."
143 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 at 79, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947).
144 This was suggested in Rogers v. Common Council of Buffalo, 123 N.Y. 173 at 186,
25 N.E. 274 (1890).
145 134 U.S. 99 at 108, 10 S.Ct. 431 (1890).
146 Comment, 46 MICH. L. R.Ev. 942 at 948 ff. (1948).
147 Bomar v. Keyes, (2d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 136 at 139; Douglas v. City of Jeannette,
319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877 (1943).
148 349 U.S. 331 at 350, 75 S.Ct. 790 (1955).
149 The Court avoided the constitutional issues and decided the case simply on the
ground that the Loyalty Review Board had no power under the executive order to
conduct -a "post-audit" of Peters' case on its own motion, after the agency loyalty board
had twice ruled there was no reasonable ground to doubt Peters' loyalty.
150 One disadvantage of the suggested test is that it ignores the fact that in both
Lovett's case, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946), and Bailey's case, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F.
(2d) 46, it was not the dismissal on loyalty grounds but the bar to future employment
which was invalidated by the courts: another is that it is subject to the same objections
which have been sufficient to deny relief in other cases.
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working for the government. For although, as was pointed out in
Friedman v. Schwellenbach,15 1 the power to appoint includes the
power to condition or qualify the appointment, it does not follow
that every denial of a privilege is constitutional.
In the case of the postal system the courts have frequently
held152 that the use of the mails, though a privilege, is not one
which may be extended or withheld on any grounds. The government is under no obligation to establish a post office in a particular
locality but once it does so it cannot arbitrarily pick and choose
those members of the public whom it will serve.153 Again, in
determining whether any publication is obscene the postmaster
general necessarily passes on a question involving the fundamental
liberties of the citizen, which is a judicial and not an executive
function and must be exercised according to the ideas of due
process implicit in the Fifth Amendment.154
Another analogy is from the Supreme Court decision in Frost
v. Railroad Commission of Califorriia. 155 In that case the Court
held that, assuming that the use of its highways by private carriers
for hire is a privilege which the state may deny, it cannot constitutionally affix to that privilege the unconstitutional condition that the carrier shall assume against his will the burdens and
duties of a common carrier. The rationale of the Court is particularly pertinent to the present discussion. Justice Sutherland,
delivering the opinion of the Court, said:
151 (D.C. Cir. 1946) 159 F. (2d) 22 at 24.
152 United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social

Democrat Publishing Co. v. Burleson, 255
U.S. 407, 41 S.Ct. 352 (1921); Pike v. Walker, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 37; Hannegan
v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 66 S.Ct. 456 (1946).
153 See Pike v. Walker, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 37 at 39. It is this factor which
disproves the validity of an analogy drawn from the oft-quoted dicta in Packard v.
Banton, 264 U.S. 140 at 145, 44 S.Ct. 257 (1924), that "a distinction must be observed
between the regulation of an activity which may be engaged in as a matter of right and
one carried on by government sufferance or permission. In the latter case the power to
exclude altogether generally includes the lesser power to condition and may justify a
degree of regulation not admissible in the former." It may also be argued that there is
an essential distinction between the mail service and public employment which nullifies
the validity of the analogy. The postal system is a monopoly which the government
enforces through statutes forbidding the carrying of letters by other means whereas
people do not have to work for the government. But, in view of the relation of allegiance
and its correlative existing between the citizen and his government, and of the fact that
the government is by far the largest employer of labor in die country and plays such a
dominant part in the lives of the people, this argument should not be deemed controlling.
154 Walker v. Popenoe, (D.C. Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 511. And, in Hannegan v.
Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 at 151, 66 S.Ct. 456 (1945), the Court characterized the power
of censorship to be "a power •.. so abhorrent to our traditions" and said that a purpose
on the part of Congress to grant that power to the Postmaster General was not lightly to
be inferred.
155 271 U.S. 583, 46 S.Ct. 605 (1926).
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"It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a
general rule, the state, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to
impose. But, the power of the state in that respect is not
unlimited; and one of the limitations is that it may not
impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the surrender
of one constitutional ·right as a condition of its favor, it
may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution
of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence."156
On this basis it may reasonably be maintained (though the
proposition is not free from difficulties157) that the "right" to,
or "privilege" of government employment is one of the liberties
protected by the due process clause, and that removals under the
loyalty program must satisfy both substantive and procedural due
process. However, this argument has little chance of prevailing
in the courtroom. On the one hand, there is only a tenuous
connection between the "right" or "privilege" of government
employment and "liberty or property" within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment. On the other hand, if that connection was
considered sufficient to require the application of due process
requirements, it would be necessary not only to overturn literally dozens of cases158 and, furthermore, to hold the Lloyd-La
Follette Act which was originally enacted as a concession to civil
servants unconstitutional as not affording them sufficient protection,159 but also to scrap part of the theory of executive power
and administrative supervision explained in the Myers case. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the courts would venture into
such uncharted and hazardous waters.
The dictum in the United Public Workers case 160 that arbitrary discrimination between classes of citizens in the matter of
156 Id. at 593-594.
157 The chief difficulty

is in discounting the argument that the government may
reasonably require its employees to be of unquestionable loyalty, and that the application
of the theory of the separation of powers demands that the management of internal
affairs of the executive branch of the government shall not be controlled by the judiciary.
158 E.g., see the list of cases cited in Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d)
46 at 64, n. 34.
159 See note 6 supra. It will be recalled that confrontation of witnesses and granting
of a hearing under the statute are in the discretion of the removing officer.
160 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1947).

•
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public employment is unconstitutional and the corollary that
there must be a reasonable relation between qualifications and
disqualifications for employment and the needs of the public
service indicate that action violative thereof would be an infringement of due process. The importance of this lies not in its
application to the loyalty program-for, although the earlier
executive order distinguished loyal and disloyal employees, the
classification could not be considered an arbitrary one-but in
the indication it gives that there are some rights attaching to
employment under the federal government.
4. The final constitutional issue is whether or not the executive order violates the Sixth Amendment.161 The argument for
the application of the constitutional provision is that a dismissal
on loyalty grounds is punishment and consequently can be inflicted only upon compliance with the Sixth Amendment. It is
clear that the deprivation of a privilege may amount to punishment within the protection of the clause in the Constitution
prohibiting bills of attainder162 but the courts have in recent
years narrowed the definition of punishment for this purpose.
The combined effect of United States v. Lovett and Bailey v.
Richardson indicates beyond reasonable doubt that dismissals on
loyalty grounds will not be considered punishment either within
the bills of attainder clause of the Constitution or within the
scope of the Sixth Amendment.
In Lovett's case an appropriation statute prohibited the payment of salary or compensation out of moneys then or thereafter
to be appropriated (except for services as jurors or members of the
armed forces) of the three plaintiffs unless they were again appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. The
plaintiffs sued in the Court of Claims for services rendered subsequent to the effective date of the statute and on appeal the
161 The amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." In both
Lovett's and Bailey's cases it was held that punishment can be inflicted lawfully only upon
compliance with the amendment.
162 E.g., American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 at 389-390, 70
S.Ct. 674 (1950); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 at 192, 73 S.Ct. 215 (1952); United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 at 100, 67 S.Ct. 556 (1946); United States v.
Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 at 316, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946).
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Supreme Court held that the act was a bill of attainder and not
a mere appropriation measure over which Congress has complete
control.. The decision was rested on the grounds that "permanent
proscription from any opportunity to serve the Government is
punishment,"163 and the fact that punishment is inflicted through
the instrumentality of an act specifically cutting off the pay of
certain named individuals found by Congress to be guilty of disloyalty makes it no less effective than if it had been done by a
statute which designated the conduct as criminal.
Four years later in Bailey v. Richardson164 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia applied the reasoning in Lovett's
case to invalidate an order of the Loyalty Review Board barring
her from the federal service for three years as amounting to
punishment within the aegis of the Sixth Amendment. However,
the court rested its decision squarely on the fact that dismissal
itself does not amount to punishment-it was the proscriptive
nature of the order which did that.165
Professor Gardner166 develops the interesting thesis from these
decisions that the essential constituent of punishment is not the
infliction of physical hardship but the expression of the community's hatred, fear or contempt, and thus that, "Any official
decision which passes a moral judgment on a named individual
and, as a consequence of that. judgment, deprives the individual
of the opportunity to associate, cooperate, and compete with his
fellow citizens on a basis of complete equality, has the character of
a criminal judgment, and may therefore be rendered only after
a public trial upon such evidence as would be admissible in a
criminal case."167 This approach derives some support from
Bridges v. Wixon 168 and Schneiderman v. United States169 where
deportation, though not technically a criminal proceeding, was
held, because of its penal nature, to have to comply with the most
rigid standards of a fair hearing. On the other hand, in the
163 328 U.S. 303 at 316, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946).
164 (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46.
165 Although it may be argued that in practice

a finding of disloyalty, which no other
board would be likely to reject later, is as permanent a bar from federal employment as
that condemned in Lovett's case, the fact remains that in law there is a distinction and
the distinction saves both the employer's inherent right to discharge and the applicant's
inherent right to be considered and not adjudged ineligible illegally.
166 Gardner, "Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the United States," 33
BOST. UNIV. L. REV. 176 (1953).
167 Id. at 191.
168 326 U.S. 135, 65 S.Ct. 1443 (1945).
169 320 U.S. 118, 63 S.Ct. 1333 (1943).
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Japanese exclusion cases170 no procedural safeguards were required
by the courts even though the decisions involved the admission
of a presumption of disloyalty against the Japanese race-a presumption which had originally been invoked by the executive
and legislature. Again, the provision in the Labor-Management
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act171 denying the benefits of the
statute to labor unions unless their officers file non-Communist
affidavits was upheld in American Communications Association v.
Douds.172 Referring to the Japanese exclusion cases, the Court
said that, if accidents of birth and ancestry under some circumstances justify an inference concerning future conduct, it can
hardly be doubted that voluntary affiliations and beliefs justify
a similar inference when drawn by the legislature on the basis
of its investigations. Furthermore, the court in Bailey v. Richardson stressed the fact that proscription for a short period of time
may not always amount to punishment.173
There is a further reason why Professor Gardner's thesis must
be rejected. The judicial process requirements of the Sixth
Amendment are not applicable to an honest exercise of executive
power such as the discharge of an employee performing predominantly executive functions, 174 and the extension of judicial interference impliedly advocated by Professor Gardner would be contrary to the basic concept of the separation of powers in that it
would have the effect of forcing the President to retain the services of persons whose loyalty he reasonably doubts.175
Even though the wisdom of implementing the loyalty program
may be doubted, even if it promotes only witch-hunting, disillusionment and fear, even if it sterilizes the civil service, induces
conformity to set standards and muzzles the freedom of political
170 E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193 (1944); Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct. 1375 (1942).
17161 Stat. L. 136 at 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §141 et seq.
172 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674 (1950).
173 Bailey v. Richardson, (D.C. Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 46 at 55: "A general order that
no person who is denied permanent employment after a conditional appointment be
reemployed for three years might well be valid. The bar in the present proceeding
appears on the record to be one imposed by the Board upon this particular individual in
this particular case as a matter of individual adjudication."
174 Thus, in Kutcher v. Gray, (D.C. Cir. 1952) 199 F. (2d) 783, it was held that
proceedings involving an employee under the loyalty program are purely administrative
in character, in no sense criminal, and do not require the constitutional and traditional
safeguards of a judicial trial.
175 Professor Gardner's other thesis ["Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of
the United States," 33 BoST. UNIV. L. REv. 176 (1953)] is that there should be a distinction
drawn between discharge for inefficient service and dismissal for dishonorable conduct
deserves serious consideration.
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expression of those in the employ of the government,17 6 there is
little chance, unless the courts are willing to make a radical departure not merely from decisions but from principles which
have been the outgrowth of the basic theory of government, i.e.,
of the separation of powers, that in its present form it will be
challenged successfully.
D. The Civil Servant and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Another loyalty problem arises from the refusal by government
employees or applicants for positions in the government service
to give evidence on the grounds that it might tend to incriminate
them. Does the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment177 constitute grounds
for the removal of a government servant or the disqualification of
an applicant for federal employment? Although it is frequently
done in practice, it is not proper to presume guilt from the silence
of a person called upon to testify, for "The privilege is for the
innocent as well as the guilty and no inference can be drawn
against the person claiming it that he fears that he is 'engaged in
doing something forbidden by federal law.' " 178 The point is that
to infer guilt in such a case is not simply to deny a privilege
guaranteed by the Constitution; it is also contrary to the popularlyrespected principle that a person shall be presumed innocent until
he is proved guilty. Admittedly there are no Supreme Court
decisions which go so far as to say that the presumption of innocence is an established constitutional principle but there are
certainly numerous federal and state statutes based on that premise.
In fact, invocation of the privilege is very likely to raise a presumption of guilt179 in the minds of the public, and there is no
176 For a factual analysis of the loyalty program and its policy aspects, see BoNTECOu,
THE FEDERAL LoYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM (1953).
1.77 U.S. CONST., amend. V, provides: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself..•."
178 Spector v. United States, (9th Cir. 1951) 193 F. (2d) 1002 at 1006. And see 8
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., 276 ff. (1940), particularly §2251 where he summarizes the
_policy reasons for the privilege as "The truth is that the privilege exists for the sake of ·
the innocent-or at least for reasons irrespective of the guilt of the accused."
179 E.g., In re Shorter, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 12811 at 19 (D.C. Ala. 1865) (in denouncing
a statute prescribing a test oath for attorneys wishing to practice in the federal courts):
"The maxim of the law is, 'Accusare nemo debet se, nisi coram Deo.' The demand of this
statute is that by the offer of affirmative proof of innocence the applicant for admission
to practice shall create, as against himself, a presumption of guilt.•.. If he keep silence,
he is thereby deprived of a constitutional right; if he speak, he becomes 'a witness against
himself.'"
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charge more difficult to refute than an allegation of disloyalty. The
effect of this is aggravated by the fact that in times of crisis the
easiest way to discredit and ruin a person in the eyes of the community is to brand him as disloyal.
What we have just said is not the whole answer to the problem.
It is not sufficient to say that, even though public employment
may be termed a privilege rather than a right, refusal of, or removal from government employment is necessarily unconstitutional if based on the invocation of the privilege against selfincrimination. The point is that the courts have (apparently
conclusively) held that refusal of employment or dismissal from
the government service is not in itself punishment calling for the
application of due process or Sixth Amendment procedures. As
we saw earlier, the government may require qualifications for
federal employment so long as they bear reasonable relation to
the work involved and to the efficiency of the service. There are
some exceptions to this180 but the only important one for our
purposes is that the government cannot impose arbitrary discriminations. In Wieman v. Updegraff181 (which, however, concerned
a state and not a federal employee) the Court said that "constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory." It is not sufficient to answer that the government may
dismiss persons whose loyalty is doubtful; the point is that a refusal to testify does not necessarily imply that the witness is disloyal,182 and it may be argued that it is "patently arbitrary" to
dismiss an employee for the sole reason that he has claimed a
privilege guaranteed to him by the Constitution.183
180 E.g., a disqualification will be invalid if it involves an executive or legislative
determination of culpability. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073
(1946); Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 277 (1866).
181344 U.S. 183 at 192, 73 S.Ct. 215 (1952). And see Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 at 585, 57 S.Ct. 883 (1937), and Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 at 14, 59 S.Ct.
379 (1939), which indicate that the protection of due process extends to any type of
arbitrary discrimination by the government.
182 See Griswold, "The Fifth Amendment: An Old and Good Friend,'' 40 A.B.A.J.
502 (1954), where the author explains how a man may be quite innocent of any disloyalty
and yet feel obliged to invoke the protection of the privilege. But the privilege is personal
and may not be used simply to shield others. See Saffo v. United States, (8th Cir. 1954)
213 F. ( 2d) 131.
183 See pp. 241-245 supra, where it is pointed out that, even where it grants a privilege,
the government cannot impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. In view of this it is not clear that the government could insist on the waiver
of the privilege as a condition of federal employment when making the original appointment to the government service. If the waiver requirement were restricted to matters
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There have been two recent federal cases bearing directly
on this point. In Orloff v. Willoughby 184 the plaintiff, a physician
inducted into the Army under the Doctors' Draft Law, was denied
a commission because of his refusal on grounds of possible selfincrimination to state in connection with his application therefor
whether he was or had been a member of the Communist Party.
In denying his petition for a commission and for an order of discharge from the Army the Court said that, although Orloff could
not be punished for claiming a constitutional privilege, the President is not required to appoint to a position of honor and trust
any person who refuses on grounds of possible self-incrimination
to say whether he is or has been a member of the Communist
Party.185 Justice Black in his dissenting judgment inferred that
the retention of Orloff in the Army in his then capacity was punishment and added: "And if some kind of punishment is to be imposed for asserting constitutional rights, it should not be imposed
relevant to the employee's position, it might well be considered constitutional. On the
other hand, if the waiver requirement was absolute, it could reasonably be argued that it
was invalid on the ground that it arbitrarily discriminated against persons in non-sensitive
positions in the government service because it was not reasonably related to the due
performance of their duties. Although a federal servant may invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination [Rogers v. United States, (10th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d) 559], there are two
points which support the view that the privilege is not an absolute right and, therefore,
that the compulsory waiver of it by government workers as a condition of their employment may be subject to the "reasonable relation" test. In the first place, it is worth noting
that the privilege is not safeguarded to the same extent as freedom of speech and religion
[see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 at 323-328, 58 S.Ct. 149 (1937)], nor is it considered an element of due process [ibid.; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 at 91-98 and
106-114, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 at 50-55, 67 S.Ct. 1672
(1947)]. In the second place, the constitutional guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments relating to criminal prosecutions may not be invoked in cases arising in the land
or naval forces of the United States. The military law is due process of law to those in
the armed forces and it is sufficient if proceedings comply with the military law. Ex parte
Benton, (D.C. Cal. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 808, and the authorities there cited; Burns v. Wilson,
346 U.S. 137, 73 S.Ct. 1045 (1953).
184 345
185 Id.

U.S. 83, 73 S.Ct. 534 (1953).
at 91-92, where the pith of the matter is well stated by Jackson, J., for the
Court " . . . we cannot doubt that the President of the United States before certifying
his confidence in an officer and appointing him to a commissioned rank, has the right to
learn whatever facts the President thinks may affect his fitness..•. [I]f there had never
been an Attorney General's list the President would be within his rights in asking any
questions he saw fit about the habits, associations and attitudes of the applicant for his
trust and honor. Whether Orloff deserves appointment is not for judges to say. . . ."
For the courts to interfere without further reason in that way would be unjustifiable
prying into the affairs of the executive branch.
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without a trial according to due process of law."186 The fallacy
in this argument is the assumption that Orloff was suffering
punishment in its legal sense. Of course, if the invocation of the
privilege entailed not only dismissal but also permanent proscription from the government service, the statute imposing that requirement would be invalid as a bill of attainder.187
Eighteen months later a district court in Levin v. Gillespie188
held that a doctor's refusal t~ fill out a loyalty certificate in his
application for an Army commission, claiming privilege against
self-incrimination, furnished no grounds for his discharge from
the service under conditions other than honorable following his
induction under the Doctors' Draft Law for non-commissioned
service. The court considered that no inferences unfavorable in
character might be drawn from a resort to the constitutional
privilege. Consequently, it held that there had been no finding
regarding the doctor which would justify a conclusion that he
had engaged in subversive activities or other conduct inimical to
the welfare of the United States, so entitling the Army to give him
a dishonorable discharge.
These decisions do not settle the issues but they do indicate
that the courts will apply the principles suggested earlier and that
they will uphold the discharge of a federal servant for refusing
on claim of privilege to testify, so long as the removal both meets
the test of reasonableness and is not patently arbitrary or discriminatory. In the event a statute189 requiring dismissal of
government servants who refuse to testify on the grounds of possible self-incrimination is held unconstitutional, the government
could validly achieve the same result by the use of immunity
statutes. The use of this device has the great advantage that under
immunity statutes the privilege against self-incrimination cannot
186 Id.

at 97.
States v. Lovett, ~28 U.S. 303, 66 S.Ct. 1073 (1946).
188 (D.C. Cal. 1954) 121 F. Supp. 726.
189 Although there is no federal statute prescribing removal for this reason, it is
interesting to note that, under §8 (a) (8) of Exec. Order No. 10450 (1953), the refusal upon
the ground of constitutional privilege against self-incrimination to testify before a congressional committee regarding charges of alleged disloyalty or other misconduct is one of
the matters to be investigated in determining whether or not the employment of a person
or his retention in the employment of the federal government is "clearly consistent with
the interests of the national security."
187 United
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be claimed. It follows that a dismissal based on the testimony of
a governme_nt servant given under such a statute would be founded
squarely on an admission of guilt and not on inferences drawn
from the claim of constitutional privilege.190
190 This is the position under a recent Act of Congress-68 Stat. L. 745 (1954), 18
U.S.C.A. §3486. The statute empowers congressional committees, the federal courts or
grand juries, to compel testimony on matters relating to treason, sabotage, espionage,
sedition, seditious conspiracy or the overthrow of the government by force or violence;
and in all cases there are at least two other independent but interested parties which must
concur in the grant of immunity in order to meet the requirements of the statute.

